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Abstract: The study of the judicial protection profiles of the agencies deserves to be addressed starting 
from an analysis of the evolution of the discipline, which, in the silence of the Treaties, has long been 
dictated by the courts of Luxembourg until the final and most recent act, or the constitutionalization by 
the Lisbon Treaty of the principles contained in a fundamental arrest of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU). The present work is important because has as a main scope to analyse the 
judicial profile of EU agencies according to CJEU jurisprudence. The present paper is based on a 
original, personal research of CJEU jurisprudence using some articles of the Lisbon Treaty and it gives 
light to a sector (EU agencies) that until now the doctrine has been very limited and general attributing 
with precise way to the evolution of EUlaw. 
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1. Introduction 
The judicial approach and the investigation of agencies in European Union law is 
necessary both to understand the real motivations underlying the innovations 
produced by the Treaty of Lisbon on jurisdictional protection, also fundamental for 
the analysis of the admissibility of the delegation of powers to the agencies (Mendez, 
2013, pp. 207ss; Costa, 2016, pp. 69ss; Simoncini, 2018)2, in order to understand the 
possibilities of control of the acts of the agencies of the former third pillar that, still 
for a few, are subject to the discipline previously in force. 
                                                             
1 Professor, European Union Law at the Fletcher School-Tufts University (MA in international law and 
MA of Arts in Law and diplomacy), International and European Criminal and Procedural Law at the 
De Haagse Hogenschool-The Hague. Attorney at Law a New York and Bruxelles, USA, Address: Tufts 
University, 160 Packard Ave., Medford, MA 02155 USA, Corresponding author: 
d.liakopoulos.lawtufts@gmail.com. 
2See the case: T-123/00, Dr. Karl Thomae GmbH v. Commission of the European communities of 10 
December 2002, ECLI:EU:T:2002:307 II-5193. 
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The evolution of agencies and the express attribution to the latter of binding decision-
making powers has led to the provision of internal recourse commissions to offer to 
the possibly injured parties the possibility of challenging the work of the agencies. 
This has certainly helped to limit the onset of problems, but has not been able to 
avoid it altogether, since all the other agencies of European Union, without a means 
of internal recourse, were nevertheless expanding bodies, equipped with their own 
legal personality, active autonomously in fields such as personnel management, the 
call for tenders and, more generally, the administrative procedures within which they 
assisted the European Commission (EC), even if formally with advisory only powers 
(Everson, Monda, Vos (eds.), 2014; Vos, 2010, pp. 152ss). 
In the case of the drug evaluation procedure, for the first time the problem of the 
agency's decision-making has been posed: at this juncture the final decision is still 
up to the EC, while the initial decision, aimed at checking that the applicant respects 
all the criteria set by the standard are the sole responsibility of the European 
Medicines Agency. Called to decide on the legality of this administrative decision, 
in a case brought against the EC and not against the agency, the Court of Justice of 
the European Union (CJEU) ruled the complainant charging, in fact, for the EC the 
responsibility for a decision of others1. Therefore, the first method of solving the 
problem was to identify another responsible party, evidently included in the group 
of subjects in the list of passive legitimates of the cancellation action. This approach 
was confirmed when such an action was carried out by citing both the EC and the 
agency: in fact, the CJEU accepted the action only against the former, rejecting the 
one against the latter, on the reason that it did not appear between the institutions 
mentioned in the then art. 230 TCE (Chamon, 2016, pp. 330ss; Lenaerts, Maselis, 
Gutman, 2014, pp. 133ss)2. 
This approach, however, could not apply to all fields, because it would lend the EC 
the responsibility of all the bodies of the Union gravitating around her, in spite of 
their respective responsibilities and the same evolution of the Union agencies. For 
this reason, in 2008 the Court of First Instance (General Court with Lisbon Treaty) 
applied the reasoning held by the CJEU in the Les Verts sentence (Saurer, 2009, pp. 
1022ss; Craig, 2015, pp. 367ss)3 to the agencies (in particular, to the European 
                                                             
1See the order in case: T-133/03, Schering-Plough v. Commission and EMEA of 4 December 2007, 
ECLI:EU:T:2007:365, not published, par. 22. 
2CJEU, C-294/83, Parti écologiste “Les Verts” v. Parliament of 23 April 1986, ECLI:EU:C:1986:166, 
p. I-01339. 
3CJEU, C-294/83, Parti écologiste “Les Verts” v. Parliament of 23 April 1986, op. cit., T-411/06, 
Sogelma v. European Agency of Reconstruction (AER) of 8 October 2008, ECLI:EU:T:2008:419, II-
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Agency for the Reconstruction of the former Yugoslavia) stating that, by that 
judgment, “the general principle that any act adopted by a Community body intended 
to produce legal effects towards third parties must be subject to judicial review”1,can 
not be deduced from the fact that in the sentence Les Verts the CJEU only mentioned 
the european Institutions, among which the agency in question was evidently not 
included. 
A similar reasoning to the one described above had been invoked a few years earlier, 
from an Advocate General (Birkinshaw, Varney, 2010, pp. 100ss; Busuioc, 2013, pp. 
208ss. Cloots, 2015, pp. 93ss)2,in an appeal for annulment brought by Spain against 
Eurojust for the annulment of a decision by the latter concerning the recruitment of 
staff, vitiated by an alleged violation of the principle of non-discrimination on the 
basis of certain choices on the requirements for choosing candidates (in particular, 
the problem lay in a breach of the principle of multilingualism). The CJEU, however, 
did not follow the conclusions of the Advocate General, stating rather that the 
challenged acts were not among those on which the CJEU could exercise its 
legitimacy control; the combined provisions of art. 41 and 35 TEU then in force 
(Hartkamp, Siburgh, Devroe, 2017, pp. 282ss; Lenaerts, Maselis, Gutman, 2014, pp. 
133ss; Wierzbowski, Gubrynowicz, 2015; Türk, 2010; Woods, Watson, 2017, pp. 
37ss; Barnard, Peers, 2017, pp. 788ss; Berry,Homewood, Bogusz, 2013; Conway, 
2015; Nicola, Davies, 2017; Usherwood, Pinder, 2018),in fact, greatly restricted the 
competences of the CJEU in the field of police and judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters. Moreover, in this case the candidates could have challenged the ban which 
was considered illegitimate under the legislation laid down in the Staff Regulations, 
without the general principle of full and effective judicial protection being 
considered to be harmed. 
  
                                                             
02791, made in conclusion of a proceeding concerning an application for annulment of the EAR 
decisions on public procurement. In particular, in paragraphs 36-37, the Judge, comparing the situation 
of the Community bodies endowed with the power to adopt acts intended to produce legal effects vis-
à-vis third parties to that which gave rise to the judgment in Les Verts. and sharing its reasoning, has  
enshrined the general principle under which any act adopted by a Community body intended to produce 
legal effects vis-à-vis third parties must be subject to judicial review, finding it unacceptable, in a 
european of law, that such acts sorts can escape judicial control. Principle also enshrined in relation to 
acts of the EFDO agency, as attributable to the decision-making power of the Commission and, 
therefore, subject to judicial review, in case: T-369/94, DIR International Film and others v. European 
Commission of 19 February 1998, ECLI:EU:C:1998:39, II-00357, par. 55. 
1See the conclusions of the Advocate General M. Poiares Maduro in case C-160/03, Spain v. Eurojust 
of 16 December 2004, ECLI:EU:C:2004:817, I-02077. 
2CJEU, C-160/03, Spain v. Eurojust of 15 March 2005, ECLI:EU:C:2005:168, I-02077. 
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2. The Lisbon Treaty: A general and Residual Protection 
Firstly, the agencies of the former third pillar, because of the known, complete, 
communitarization of that sector, are now equated with the european agencies; 
however, pursuant to Protocol no. 36 annexed to the Treaties, the acts adopted on the 
basis of titles V and VI of the TUE (Barnard, Peers, 2017) prior to the entry into 
force of the Treaty of Lisbon which have not been subsequently amended continue 
to follow the previous framework which, as seen above with Spain v. Eurojust 
(Groussot, Peturson, 2015; Sànchez, 2012, pp. 1566ss; Tridimas, 2014, pp. 364ss; 
Von Der Groeben, Schwarze,Hatje, 2015, pp. 820ss; Stern, Sachs, 2016, pp. 
756ss; Peers et al. (eds.), 2014, pp. 1523-1538; Meyer (ed.), 2014, pp. 813-826), 
without allow full control of the CJEU. The transitional period, however, is about to 
end, running out five years after the entry into force of the Reform Treaty. The 
agencies operating in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) sector, 
however, continue to follow the discipline of that sector and, therefore, to escape 
from the control of the CJEU, pursuant to art. 275 TFEU (Da Cruz Vilaça, 2014; 
Folsom, 2017, pp. 278ss; Geiger, Khan, Kotzur, 2016; DECHEVA, 2018). Excluding 
these sectoral specificities, EU agencies are now explicitly mentioned within many 
mechanisms of direct control of the legitimacy of acts and behaviors. The action of 
non-contractual liability, on the other hand, does not explicitly mention the agencies; 
the CJEU is nevertheless competent to know the causes related to the agencies, by 
express provision of the deeds establishing the same, within the limits that will be 
seen later. Furthermore, the fact that the agencies are covered by the exception of 
invalidity deserves special prominence, since this implies that the legislator has not 
ruled out that these bodies may issue binding acts of general application. In this 
regard, moreover, it should be noted that, faced with acts of agencies with general 
scope, another amendment introduced by the Lisbon Treaty assumes importance for 
the agencies, and in particular the introduction of “regulatory acts” (Berström,2014, 
pp. 484ss; Thorson, 2016, pp. 106ss) as acts susceptible to appeal against conditions 
favored by non-privileged applicants. In fact, the decisions issued by the bodies in 
question, when they have general scope, seem to be able to fully embrace this 
category. 
The agencies are also mentioned in the provision for a preliminary ruling (article 267 
TFEU) (Böttner, Grinc, 2018, pp. 35ss; Barnard, Peers, 2017, pp. 586ss; Foster, 
2016; Thies, 2013; Edward, Lane, 2013), which is the culmination of a very 
significant recognition process. To the picture outlined there are also some provisions 
that emerge from the Statute of the CJEU, under which the agencies now have the 
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possibility to intervene in the pending judgments both ad adiuvandum (article 40) 
and ad opponendum (art 42); in the first case, however, the agencies are not 
equivalent to the institutions of the Union, having to show an interest in the 
resolution of the dispute submitted to the CJEU, but not even to natural and legal 
persons, well being able to intervene even in cases between privileged applicants. 
Finally, the agencies are also treated as institutions in the burdens, the CJEU being 
able to request them to provide “all the information it deems necessary for the 
process” (article 24) (Barnard, Peers, 2017). 
Furthermore, the agencies were equally included, and in this case also fully 
assimilated to the Institutions of the Union, in the provision of some general 
principles of administrative action that no body of the Union can harm; these are 
provided for in art. 298, par. 1, TFEU, which states that “in carrying out their tasks 
the institutions, organs and bodies of the Union are based on an open, effective and 
independent European administration” (Barnard, Peers, 2017; Nicola, Davies, 2017), 
as well as art. 41 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFREU) 
(Groussot, Petursson, 2015; Sànchez, 2012, pp. 1566ss; Tridimas, 2014, pp. 364ss; 
Von Der Groeben, Scwarze,Hatje, 2015, pp. 820ss; Stern, Sachs, 2016, pp. 756ss; 
Peers et al. (eds.), 2014, pp. 1523-1538; Meyer (ed.), 2014, pp. 813-826), which also 
explicitly links the agencies to respect the right of citizens of the Union to good 
administration. 
Ultimately, the reform of the Treaties has therefore extended, in broad and general 
terms, to the jurisdictional protection offered by the CJEU on the acts and behaviors 
of the agencies, almost equating them to the institutions of the Union; only two 
aspects could be underlined which could be taken into consideration for future 
changes. 
The regulation of non-contractual liability does not mention the agencies, but only 
the institutions and agents (article 340 TFEU) (Barnard, Peers, 2017; Nicola, Davies, 
2017): This reflects the legislator's desire to have a free hand in regulating specific 
cases even without the attribution of powers to the CJEU, circumstance that has been 
recorded in rather rare cases and that for reasons of uniformity and clarity of the 
institutional location of the agencies, it could be overcome. The agencies are not in 
any way included among the legitimates active in the action for annulment, having 
therefore to place themselves within the category of non-privileged applicants. At 
the moment, this can still be explained by the fact that they did not want to fully 
express the potential of delegating executive powers to agencies, as happened on the 
national level; if this were to happen, the granting of a semi-privileged status similar 
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to that enjoyed by the European Central Bank and the Committee of the Regions 
could be necessary to protect the prerogatives of the agencies and make them 
responsible for defending their powers. 
It should be emphasized that the legislation introduced with the reform of the Treaties 
has a residual nature, because it has been grafted into a situation in which, at the level 
of secondary legislation, other mechanisms of judicial protection had already been 
foreseen, which the new legislation does not repeal but on the contrary, it supports, 
by providing rules of primary rank that guarantee a (high) minimum standard of 
jurisdictional control. In other words, the provisions just examined constitute a 
clause for the closure of the system of judicial protection from the acts of the 
agencies, which aims at avoiding the occurrence of situations in which those who 
have suffered an injury remain unprotected. Not by chance, in fact, art. 263, par. 5, 
TFEU (Nowak, 2011; Chalmers, Davies, Monti, 2014; Tilltson, Foster, 2013; 
Horspool, Humphreys, 2012, pp. 552ss), expressly states that “the acts setting up the 
organs and bodies of the Union may provide for specific conditions and procedures 
relating to actions brought by natural or legal persons against acts of such organs or 
bodies intended to produce legal effects on them” (Barnard, Peers, 2017; Nicola, 
Davies, 2017).In the rest of the analysis we will analyze in detail the additional 
protection tools that can be activated with some agencies. 
 
3. The Special Provisions Contained in the Acts establishing the 
European Agencies 
A general examination of the agency's founding acts reveals a rather fragmented 
context, as was expected, given the particular nature of the interventions. In most 
cases, there is simply no indication of any possibility of checking the legitimacy of 
the agencies' work: In all these cases, therefore, the only applicable rules will be 
those contained in the Treaties. In two circumstances, on the other hand, the 
possibility of referring the CJEU to censure the actions or behaviors held by the 
agency deemed illegitimate is explicitly referred to. This, evidently, is a legacy of 
the situation (and of the uncertainties) prior to the entry into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty and can only be found in the founding regulations of the European Union 
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Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA)1 and the European Aviation Safety Agency 
(EASA)2. 
In the first case, the CJEU expressly decided to give the power to hear appeals for 
annulment and inadequacy presented to the agency, under the conditions envisaged 
by the Treaties: It is probable that, in this situation, the value of the Politics of the 
agency's field of operation, which was intended to explicitly confirm, at the time in 
a manner not entirely tautological, the controllability by the courts of Luxembourg. 
The second case, on the other hand, is more interesting because the Aviation Safety 
Agency is also equipped with an internal appeals commission to hear complaints 
from sector operators (Buess, 2014, pp. 96ss) against the agency's decisions; this 
specification of a parallel possibility of direct appeal before the CJEU is rather 
particular, because it is attributed only to the Member States and to the institutions 
of the Union. Before the entry into force of the reform of primary law, this provision 
opened interesting scenarios on the possibility of a more incisive control of the work 
of the agency by privileged applicants; to date, in truth, it does not seem to attribute 
any more possibility that is not already foreseen by the Treaties themselves (Busuioc, 
2013, pp. 199-200). 
In another case, related to the European Medicinal Agencies (EMA) (Vos, 2012, pp. 
370ss; Groenleer, 2012, pp. 136ss), it is possible to request an internal body of the 
agency to re-examine its position (Hoffmann, Morini, 2012, pp. 422ss). A similar 
situation is thus outlined, but not framed in the more complex mechanisms of 
preventive protection that will soon be examined; in this case, in fact, there is a 
possibility of internal auditing of the agency by the same body that has already 
adopted the deed. In particular, in the authorization procedure for the placing on the 
market of medicinal products, a scientific committee within the agency itself issues 
an opinion, which is then transmitted to the EC which in fact confines itself to 
validating its content assuming formal responsibility for the act. If the committee's 
opinion is negative, it may be re-examined by the committee itself. The applicant 
must provide detailed reasons for the review request (Hoffmann, Morini, 2012)3, 
which will then be carried out by a rapporteur, and a possible co-rapporteur, other 
than those appointed for the initial opinion, but always internal to the committee. 
The review procedure will cover only those points of the opinion identified by the 
                                                             
1Art. 27, par. 3, of founding regulation of FRA. 
2Art. 51 of founding regulation of EAS. 
3Art. 9, par. 2, of founding regulation EMA. 
ISSN: 2068 –5459                                                              ADMINISTRATIO 
139 
applicant and can only be based on scientific data that were available at the time of 
the adoption of the initial opinion by the Committee. The most important and 
emblematic cases of the mechanisms of preventive protection contained in the 
instruments establishing the agencies are, however, others, which concern the 
possibility of a re-examination by a Board of Appeal within the agency, or an 
administrative appeal before the EC (Busuioc, 2012, pp. 720ss). 
In both cases, which can also coexist in the same agency, then emerge a plurality of 
forms of protection that significantly amplify the possibilities for the individual to 
obtain justice. The second instrument was born with the first agencies of 1975 and 
then was replicated in a few other cases; now it seems, in truth, to have fallen into 
disuse. The former, on the other hand, can be considered a standard measure that is 
adopted whenever the agency is expressly endowed with binding decision-making 
powers towards natural or legal persons. It has been argued that the granting of quasi-
judicial powers to internal commissions “should constitute the ordinary system of 
administrative protection towards the satellite administration”; this does not seem to 
be entirely acceptable, since this option has been mentioned during the inter-
institutional debate on the setting of agencies and not in the last of 20081. 
Furthermore, it has not been qualified in the main or subordinate mechanisms of 
administrative protection, as also emerges from the recent joint declaration, where 
the EU legislator has limited itself to dictating certain commitments to improve their 
functioning2. 
It should also be noted that no other administrative or para-judicial appeal has ever 
been mentioned in the interinstitutional debate, not even the existing one of the 
administrative appeal to EC (Egeberg, Trondal, Vestlund, 2015, pp. 611ss). 
Furthermore, the EU legislator has drawn a clear parallel between the conferral of 
decision-making powers to agencies and the provision of internal commissions for 
the review of the exercise of the same. It does not seem possible to say that the Union 
legislator has obliged to provide an internal commission with any agency with 
binding powers and, consequently, it does not seem possible to affirm that this 
                                                             
1See the Commission Communication COM (2002) 718 final of 11 December 2002, Setting up of 
regulatory agencies, in particular p. 11 and 14, as well as the draft interinstitutional agreement on the 
framework for regulatory agencies, presented by the Commission on 25 February 2005, COM (2005) 
59 final, in particular p. 17. There is no indication, however, in the Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the future of the European agencies of 11 
March 2008, COM (2008) 135 final. 
2Joint Declaration by the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European 
Commission on Decentralized Agencies, 19 July 2012, in particular in par. 21; not published.  
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protection mechanism must constitute the ordinary system of protection in respect 
of acts of the agencies. In any case, it should be noted that, in fact, the legislator has 
always followed this practice, but also extends it to agencies that are not expressly 
endowed with such powers. 
 
4. The Peculiar Nature of the Boards of Appeal. 
By virtue of the aforementioned parallelism between the provision of binding powers 
and the establishment of a Board of Appeal, the agencies endowed with the latter are 
those competent in the fields of trademarks, designs and patents (European Union 
Intellectual Property Office-OHIM), plant varieties (Community Plant Variety 
Office (CPVO)), European Chemicals Agency (ECHA), Air Safety (EASA), Energy 
(European Union Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER); In 
addition, the three agencies: European Banking Authority (EBA), European Agency 
and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) and European Securities and Markets 
Authority (ESMA) (Georgosouli,2016; Wymeersch, 2012; Iglesias-Rordìguez,2018, 
pp. 590ss)1 (with European Space Agency (ESA)) have a joint Board of Appeal 
(Ossege, 2016). 
Europol and Eurojust, while not having binding powers towards individuals, collect 
a series of personal information during their duties in the field of transnational crime 
(Herwig, Hofmann, Rowe, Türk, 2018, pp. 163ss); therefore, each has its own 
common supervisory authority (the rather ambiguous adjective refers to the fact that 
the members of these are appointed by each Member State (Dammann, 2004)2, 
                                                             
1Respectively established through the adoption of the regulations already cited in num. 52, or the EU 
regulations of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010: n. 1093/2010 which 
establishes the European Banking Authority (EBA); n. 1094/2010 establishing the European Insurance 
and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA); n. 1095/2010 establishing the European Securities and 
Market Authority (ESMA). As emphasized by the doctrine, however, “(...) the regulations of the 2010 
did not intervene on the national allocation of the supervisory, information and inspection, and have 
invested the regulatory profile by formally giving the new authorities (the European Banking Authority 
and its sector counterparts: ESMA and EIOPA), established on the ashes of the old third-level 
committees of the Lamfalussy procedure, an important function of collaboration with the European 
Commission in the preparation of the legal rules of non-legislative status (meaning, according to the 
systematic sources of the TFEU) intended to complete-depending on the case, through delegated acts 
or implementing acts pursuant to art. 290 and 291 TFEU- the framework regulatory framework 
designed, in its founding elements, by the legislative provisions of the Council and of the European 
Parliament (...)”. 
2An interesting analysis, as it is transversal, of the work of the committees of appeal of the various 
agencies can be found in the detailed sheet no. 10, Boards of appeal, p. 3. An independent work, not 
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competent to monitor the processing of personal data by the agency within which it 
is constituted1. This choice was not followed in all the agencies exposed to the 
processing of a large quantity of personal data, since other agencies like Frontex do 
not have a para-judicial body but an internal office, despite the attention shown in 
the regulation establishing the same agency to protect them2. 
The nature of the committees of appeal is difficult to frame, since it is characterized 
in part by some choices of independence that characterize the activity in a quasi-
jurisdictional sense and, in other part, for strong peculiarities that betray a persistent 
belonging to the internal dimension of the agency itself. Generally speaking, 
however, it should be stressed that it does not seem possible to state that they are 
genuine independent judicial bodies located in the various agencies, but rather 
internal bodies with the same, however, considerable independent and jurisdictional 
duties. 
The GCsi is clearly expressed in this sense, in relation to OHIM's appeal 
commissions, identifying and welcoming the presence of a “functional continuity” 
(Schuibhne, Gormley, 2012)3 between the agency and the Boards of Appeal, which 
are part of the former and contribute to the implementation of the Regulation 
establishing this4. Again with regard to the same Boards of Appeal, GC itself 
acknowledged that the latter can not be classified as “court”. Consequently, the 
appellant can not validly claim a right to a fair “trial” before the Boards of Appeal of 
the Office for the Harmonization of the Internal Market5. 
The function of the committees of appeal within the agencies is framed within the 
adjudication activity, particularly known to some administrative courts of the 
common law systems (Harris, 1999, pp. 44ss), which consists of “a re-evaluation of 
the legal and substantial effectiveness and of the acceptability of the original decision 
by a body that is not part of the structure of the primary decision maker” (Blair, 2013, 
                                                             
linked to the negotiations of the joint declaration, is instead that of Dammann which, unfortunately, is 
limited to the analysis of the only two Boards of Appeal then present, or those of OHIM and CPVO. 
1Note that this choice is most likely inspired by the structure of INTERPOL, where one is planned: 
Commission de contrôle des fichiers d’INTERPOL disciplined from Règlement relatif au contrôle des 
informations et à l’accès aux fichiers d’Interpol. 
2See art. 11-13 of founding regulation of FRONTEX. 
3See the case: T-163/98, The Procter & Gamble Company v. OHMI of 8 July 1999, 
ECLI:EU:T:1999:145, II-2383, par. 38; T-252/04, Caviar Anzali SAS v. OHMI of 11 July 2006, 
ECLI:EU:T:2006:199, II-2115, par. 29. 
4See, T-163/98, The Procter & Gamble Company v. OHMI of 8 July 1999, op. cit., par. 37. 
5See, T-63/01, The Procter & Gamble Company v. OHMI of 12 December 2002, ECLI:EU:T:2002:317, 
II-5255, par. 23 
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pp. 170ss). In relation to the Joint Board of Appeal of the three financial supervisory 
authorities, the doctrine expressed a similar position, stating that it is not a 
supervisory or policy making committee. It is an appeal board with an adjudicative 
function. It will approach its task according to the type of decision under appeal” 
(Baratta, 2011, pp. 297ss; Rosas, 2012, pp. 105ss; Lock 2011, pp. 576ss; Lenaerts, 
Maselis, Gutman, 2014, pp. 552ss; Parish, 2012, pp. 143ss; Orellana Zabalza, 2012, 
pp. 62ss; Cremona, Thies, Wessel, 2017; Baratta, 2011, pp. 298ss)1. 
More specifically, the role of the Boards of Appeal seems to vary hand in hand with 
the scope and the incisiveness of the powers attributed to the agencies, while 
remaining always attached to the characteristic of the first referee of the legitimacy 
of the work of the same. The reasons for this border-line nature, not entirely 
jurisdictional but not even clearly administrative, are evidently found in the need to 
have an organism that is at the same time a high technical competence, a deep 
knowledge of the internal mechanisms of the agency and jurisdictional capacity, 
remaining independent from the agency itself but not totally unrelated to its logic: 
All needs that, obviously, can be realized differently according to the individual 
agencies. 
From the analysis of the committees of internal recourse to the agencies, a parallel 
phenomenon seems to emerge, perhaps even alternative to the creation of specialized 
courts within the CJEU, that is the fragmentation of the jurisdictional competences 
of the Union within its administrative dimension (which, in turn, constitutes another 
tendency for the more general fragmentation of jurisdictional functions in the Union 
to the advantage of the national and international level, as taught by the experience 
of the Unified Patent Court (Hilty, Jaeger, Lamping, Ullrich, 2012, pp. 12ss; 
Lamping, 2011; Troncoso, 2013, pp. 232ss; Ullrich, 2013, pp. 589-610; Pila, 
Wadlow, 2015; Storey, Pimo, 2018; Rosati, 2013; Barnard, 2016; Cloots, 2015; 
Andersen, 2012; Bradley, Travers, Whelan, 2014, pp. 178ss; Ilardi, 2015, pp. 146ss; 
Tilmann, Plasmann, 2018, pp. 210ss)2. 
                                                             
1CJEU, Opinion 1/09 (Unified Patent Litigation System) of 8 March 2011, ECLI:EU:C:2011:137, I-
01137. 
2Council Regulation (EU) No1260/2012 of 17 December 2012 implementing enhanced cooperation in 
the area of the creation of unitary patent protection with regard to the applicable translation 
arrangements, OJ L 361, 31.12.2012, p. 89-92. The agreement, in fact, not only concerns the jurisdiction 
in disputes concerning European patents and European patents with unitary effect, but also contains 
various rules of a substantive nature that would have found a more rational positioning within the 
regulation. CJEU, C-235/87, Matteucci of 27 September 1988, ECLI: EU:C:1988:460, ECR 05589, 
para. 22. C-478/07, Budĕjovický Budvar National Corporation v. Rudolf Ammersin GmbH of 8 
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In fact, although a decade ago the EC had advocated a system of judicial protection 
based on the coexistence of internal commissions and specialized courts1 and 
although in the margins of the signing of the Treaty of Nice the Luxembourg 
government had declared not to claim the headquarters of the Boards of Appeal of 
OHIM in case they had become specialized courts of the CJEU, leaving therefore to 
intend a path of evolution from an internal dimension to the administration to a 
properly independent one, to today can be affirmed how, in fact, the committees of 
appeal have replaced specialized courts, never established to a greater degree than 
that specialized in the matter of the public function. 
This phenomenon certainly raises the technical level of the judgments, but it must 
be kept under control so as not to risk undermining the general coherence of EU law. 
In this regard, the fact that the GC constitutes a substantial degree of “appeal” (the 
decisions of the Boards of Appeal are, in fact, challengeable before the CJEU of the 
European Union) offers a guarantee of uniformity of inestimable judgment, which 
however certainly implies a significant expenditure of energy by the judges of 
Luxembourg, who see themselves invested with a considerable number of very 
technical causes. At the same time, it can not fail to underline how the decision not 
to evolve the boards of appeal in real specialized courts, understandable for the 
aforementioned needs of an autonomous controller but expert in the internal 
dynamics of the agency, leads as a corollary a lowering of guarantees impartiality 
for the applicants. In fact, the committees of appeal, also because of their very nature, 
do not meet the requirements of independence in the appointment, in the status of 
judges and in the composition of the judicial panel guaranteed by the CJEU, in its 
various forms. 
In any case, the solution of not evolving the committees of appeal in real specialized 
courts still seems valid, precisely because it guarantees that intermediate level 
between administrative protection and judicial protection that, to the detriment of 
                                                             
September 2009, ECLI:EU:C:2009:521, ECR I-07721, para. 44. CJEU, C-121/85, Conegate Limites v. 
HM Customs & Excise of 11 March 1986, ECLI:EU:C:1986:114, ECR I-01007. CJEU, Joined cases 
C-241/91P and C-242/91P, Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) and Independent Television Publications Ltd 
(ITP) v. European Commission of 6 April 1995, ECLI:EU:C:1995:98, ECR I-00743. C-351/15P, 
European Commission v. Total and Elf Aquitaine of 18 January 2017, ECLI: EU: C: 2017: 27, published 
only in the electronic Reports of cases. C-434/13P, European Commission v. Parker Hannifin 
Manufacturing and Parker-Hannifin of 18 December 2014, ECLI: EU: C: 2014: 2456, published only 
in the electronic Reports of cases. T-747/15, EDF v. European Commission of 16 January 2018, ECLI: 
EU: T: 2018: 6, published only in the electronic Reports of cases. C-473/93, European Commission v. 
Luxembourg of 2 July 1996, ECLI: EU: C: 1996: 263, I-3207. 
1Communication from the Commission COM (2002) 718 final, op. cit. 
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some guarantees of third party, recovered thanks to the subsequent appeal in 
Luxembourg, allows a first litigation connoted by an incisive technical-scientific 
control on the merits of the decisions of the agency, difficult to achieve within a truly 
european jurisdiction such as the CJEU. Surely, however, a system that multiplies 
the levels of protection would raise many doubts, providing for an appeal to a 
specialized court following a first action before the Board of Appeal: In this case, in 
fact, a system characterized by four or five levels of appeal, which seems frankly 
excessive. 
 
5. The Dispute before the Boards of Appeal and the Relations with the 
CJEU 
Apart from the specificity of the Joint Supervisory Authorities of Europol and 
Eurojust, competent to control the legitimate management and holding of personal 
data by the two agencies, the Boards of Appeal are usually responsible for 
monitoring binding decisions issued by the agencies. These decisions can be 
detrimental to both private and public interests; the first case is the most frequent 
and dating back in time, the second is due to the binding powers attributed to 
agencies operating in the financial and energy sectors, which can also be exercised 
against national authorities, who also have the right to challenge the decision to them 
addressed. However, it is hardly necessary to point out how, at this juncture, national 
authorities are treated as equivalent to the other recipients, under private law, of the 
agencies decisions, without enjoying a privileged status similar to that assigned to 
the Member States under article 263, par. 2, TFEU, consistent with the practice that 
does not extend these privileges to the decentralized articulations of the same, 
different from the government structure (Barnard, Peers, 2017; Nicola, Davies, 
2017)1. 
Almost all of the Boards of Appeal have internal rules of procedure, with the sole 
exception of CPVO, whose founding regulation, however, contains a rather detailed 
framework of procedure before the Board of Appeal2. These procedural rules, 
however, are not contained in legal sources of the same value: In the case of OHIM3 
                                                             
1Commission Regulation (EC) No 216/96 of 5 February 1996 laying down the rules of procedure of the 
Boards of Appeal of the Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs), 
OJ L 28, 6.2.1996, p. 11-13. 
2Artt. 67-82 of founding regulation of CPVO. 
3Regulation (EC) n. 771/2008 of the Commission of 1 August 2008, in GUUE L 206 of 2 August 2008, 
p. 5. 
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and ECHA (Chamon, 2014, pp. 328ss)1 these are Commission regulations, while in 
all other cases of the decisions of the Boards of Appeal themselves (or, for Eurojust2 
and Europol3, of the joint supervisory authorities). In both cases, this is a derivative 
right of the Union (which, in the case of the decisions of the Boards of Appeal of the 
agencies, is characterized by strong atypical features) and for what the founding 
regulation of the agency is in any case intended. Faced with a source of the same 
hierarchical level, having an interpretative precedence, as a general source that 
dictates the principles regarding appeals, there remains a significant difference 
between the different agencies that deserves to be underlined and taken into account 
by the interpreter. 
All internal committees of appeal have the power to suspend the effects of the 
contested act4; the same can not be said for the joint supervisory authorities of 
Eurojust and Europol, probably because the complaints relating to the protection of 
personal data do not have the same precautionary requirements as those relating to 
the decisions of the other agencies. 
The founding regulations of the agencies usually attribute to the knowledge of the 
Boards of Appeal (and, therefore, allow the appellants to challenge) only specific 
decisions; the Plant Variety Office also provides for the possibility that certain of its 
decisions are appealed to the CJEU5, while several other agencies expressly provide 
that the decisions which can not be challenged before the Board of Appeal are open 
to appeal before the courts of Luxembourg, conditions dictated by the Treaties, as a 
rule to close the system to safeguard judicial protection6. These cases are attributable 
to explicit attributions of competence to the CJEU which, following the entry into 
force of the Lisbon Treaty, are tautological. Rather, it should be noted that the two 
offices of vegetable varieties and brands, designs and models do not provide for such 
                                                             
1For ACER, this is the decision n. 1/2011 of the Board of Appeal of 1 December 2011; for EBA, ESMA 
and EIOPA of Decision No 2/2012 of the Board of Appeal; for EASA, to be precise, it is both the 
regulation (CE) n. 104/2004 of the Commission dated 22nd January 2004, in OJ, L 16 of January 23rd 
2004, p. 20, which dictates some general rules, both of a decision of the Board of Appeal of which, 
however, the details were not disclosed, which instead contains the detailed rules of the procedure. 
2Act of the Joint Supervisory Authority of the Eurojust of 23 June 2009, in OJ, C 182 of 7 July 2010, 
p. 3. 
3Act No. 29/2009 of the Europol Joint Supervisory Authority of 22 June 2009, in GUUE C 45 of 23 
February 2010, p. 2. 
4Art. 58 of the regulation establishing OHIM; art. 67 of the founding regulation of CPVO; art. 44, par. 
2, of the regulation establishing EASA; art. 91, par. 2, of the founding regulation of ECHA; art. 19, par. 
3, of the regulation establishing ACER; art. 60, par. 3, of the regulations establishing ESAs. 
5Art. 74 of founding regulation of CPVO. 
6Article 94 of the founding regulation of ECHA; art. 61 of the regulations establishing ESAs; art. 20 of 
the regulation establishing ACER; art. 51 of the regulation establishing EASA.  
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rules, since they are endowed with a peculiar mechanism of a more administrative 
type. 
Some criticism has been raised about the contestable decisions before the Board of 
Appeal of the Chemicals Agency (Chamon, 2014), since the regulation establishing 
the latter would limit the possibilities for appeal, leaving out some decisions which, 
on the other hand, can be extremely important for operators in the sector. Consider, 
for example, the decision that denies the company that wants to register a chemical 
substance to present certain information separately from other competing companies 
that register the same substance, risking revealing its industrial secrets to the former; 
or, decisions regarding access to the so-called “Substance Information Exchange 
Fora” (Bartosch, 2010, pp. 442ss), a system through which preparatory work for the 
registration of new substances is carried out; or again, the decision to reject the 
petition for the confidential treatment of certain data (Bartosch, 2010). 
In all these cases, which can not be challenged before the Boards of Appeal, the 
appellant can now bring an appeal before the CJEU, which make internal remedies 
committees of the basic rules for obtaining a detailed review of the technical and 
scientific choices of the agency guaranteed by the reform of the primary right to 
challenge. Every act of production of legal effects before the CJEU should not justify 
some gaps in the internal audit system of the agencies. It seems most appropriate to 
leave the judges of Luxembourg with a nomofilattico function and, at the same time, 
to avoid depriving the sector operators of a judge with extensive technical and 
scientific expertise and not limited, in his analysis, to the simple control of flawed 
errors of rating. 
The structure of the dispute within the agencies can be divided into two categories, 
depending on whether or not there is a prior check on the appeal before the Board of 
Appeals. 
The first model, used in the cases of Europol, Eurojust, of the Agency for the 
Cooperation of National Energy Regulators and of the European Financial 
Supervision Authorities, is of the two-phase type, because it provides that the 
decision of the agency is directly challenged by the recipient before the Board of 
Appeal (or, in the first two cases, to the Joint Supervisory Authority). In this typology 
the Community Plant Variety Office may also be included, where however a 
mechanism of interlocutory revision is foreseen, such that the service of the Office 
that prepared the decision can decide to rectify it, following the appeal before the 
internal commission if it considers that the appeal is admissible and well founded. 
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The second model, instead, which is found in the three remaining cases, presupposes 
a mid-term review of the agency's decision, usually carried out either by the same 
office that issued it1, or by the executive director2, which must necessarily precede 
any appeal. In fact, it is only at a later stage that it will be possible to challenge the 
confirmation of the decision before the Board of Appeals: For this reason, it can be 
defined as three-phase. The decisions of the internal commissions are, then, always 
challengeable before the Court, competent to know the related appeals by virtue of 
the well-known system of distribution of powers among the judges of Luxembourg; 
in all cases, in fact, there is a clause providing that the agency will comply with the 
decision of CJEU3. The possibility of challenging the decisions of the internal 
committees is particularly important not only to guarantee a second degree of justice, 
as well as a general consistency and uniformity with EU law, but also because the 
judges of Luxembourg are nevertheless given powers unknown to the commissions 
of appeal: Above all, the power to order the agency to pay compensation for damages 
caused to the claimant and to take into account in the decision of the dispute also the 
possible illegality of acts of general application, through the experiment of an 
exception of illegitimacy pursuant to art. 277 TFEU by the economic operator to 
whom the agency decision is based (Chamon, 2014). 
Before examining in more detail some specificities of the appeal to the CJEU, it 
should be noted that this form of preventive protection does not seem to be 
circumvented by a direct appeal to the courts of Luxembourg. In the single case of 
the Air Safety Agency, this is explicitly stated4; in other cases, such an interpretation 
seems to be supported by the CJEU jurisprudence (in particular in the Keeling 
case5)and by the spirit of the agency's founding acts, which, as discussed above, 
provide for direct action before the Luxembourg courts as an exceptional hypothesis 
residual, in the absence of the possibility of bringing an action before the internal 
commissions. A similar conclusion, however, can also be found in relation to the 
opinions of the scientific committee within the Medicines Agency, which is also 
                                                             
1Art. 70 of founding regulation of CPVO. 
2It's the case of OHIM (art. 61 and 62 of founding regulation). 
3It's the case of EASA (art. 47 of founding regulation) and ECHA (art. 93 of founding regulation). See 
also: art. 73 of the founding regulation of CPVO; art. 65 of the regulation establishing OHIM; art. 50 
of the regulation establishing EASA; art. 94 of the founding regulation of ECHA; art. 61 of the 
regulations establishing ESAs; art. 20 of the regulation establishing ACER. 
4Art. 50, par. 2, of founding regulation of EASA. 
5See the order: T-148/97, David T. Keeling v. OHIM of 8 June 1998, ECLI:EU:T:1998:114 II-2217, 
par. 33. In this sentence, in short, it does not open to the possibility of a direct revision of the Office's 
acts precisely because of the fact that the regulation establishing the same already provides for other 
mechanisms (namely, the use of internal commissions, then appealed before the CJEU). 
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mentioned here if, as will be remembered, it is a form of preventive protection not 
exactly framed in the form of protection now under consideration, being provided 
by the same office that issued the contested act1.In this case, in fact, the failure to 
launch an internal appeal at the same office that adopted the contested opinion would 
be an acceptance of the technical assessment of the agency, which would seem to 
prevent a subsequent censorship of the legal act (Busuioc, 2012, pp. 208ss). 
The only two cases in which there is a special regulation for the use of CJEU are 
those of the two Offices for plant varieties and for trademarks and designs: In both 
cases, with an almost identical rule, it is specified that the Court can either to annul 
or to reform the decision of the Board of Appeal and limits the possibility of recourse 
to specific legal grounds (overlapping with those listed in article 263, paragraph 2, 
TFUE (Nowak, 2011. Chalmers, Davies, Monti, 2014; Tillotson, Foster, 2016; 
Horspool, Humphreys, 2012) and to certain persons. Among the persons entitled to 
take action at the CJEU, the only difference between the two offices emerges, since 
in the first case only those who have been partially unsuccessful can act in court, 
while in the second case such eventuality is not taken into consideration. The result 
that the review by the Luxembourg courts seems open only in the event of a total 
loss. 
In all other cases, however, reference should be made directly to the discipline 
dictated by art. 263 TFEU, except for the Air Safety Agency, whose founding 
regulation does not provide for an ad hoc discipline, nor does it refer to the Treaties, 
which however can certainly be called into question to fill the gap (Busuioc, 2013). 
The decisions of the internal common control authorities of Eurojust and Europol, 
on the other hand, deserve to be dealt with separately, both in relation to the 
possibility of a direct appeal, by circumventing the preventive protection offered by 
the internal offices to the agencies, as to the possibility of challenge the decisions of 
the latter before the CJEU of the European Union. It should be recalled that the joint 
supervisory authorities do not have the power to suspend the activity of preservation, 
processing and use of personal data by Eurojust and Europol pending the review 
process. This point deserves to be highlighted because of the importance of 
precautionary protection in the European litigation system as a fundamental 
instrument for a full guarantee of the right to an effective remedy enshrined in art. 
47 CFREU (Saffian, Düsterhau, 2014, pp. 3ss; Mak, 2012; Lebrun, 2016, pp. 433ss), 
although, obviously, the protection of personal data is an area where the 
                                                             
1Article 23, par. 8, of the decision establishing the Eurojust and art. 34, par. 8 of the Europol decision. 
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precautionary needs are less marked. Therefore, it can not but be noted that the 
individual can not be subtracted from the right to see his position protected pending 
resolution of the dispute and, consequently, directly challenge before the 
Luxembourg courts the act of Europol or Eurojust in which to realize an illegitimate 
management of personal data capable of causing immediate and deserving injuries 
of urgent measures. 
On the second aspect, namely the possibility of challenging the decisions of the Joint 
Supervisory Authorities before the Luxembourg courts, it should be noted that this 
was not provided for in the decisions establishing the agencies, due to specific 
political choices by the Member States to avoid being obliged to provide sensitive 
data. 
It may be questioned whether, due to the residual legal protection explicitly 
confirmed by the Lisbon Treaty, a decision of the joint supervisory authority can not 
be challenged as a productive act of legal effects towards third parties. The answer 
seems to depend on the interpretation that we want to give to art. 263, par. 5, TFEU 
(Oppermann, Classen, Nettesheim, 2016; Schütze, Tridimas, 2018; Barnard, Peers, 
2017, pp. 288ss), which can be read in two ways: On the one hand, it could be argued 
that this provision expressly recognizes the possibility that the legislator, by means 
of secondary legislation, lays down specific rules to regulate appeals concerning 
certain agencies in particular way, even going so far as to exclude the possibility of 
checking the legitimacy of the acts adopted by the agencies in terms of decisions 
taken through these specific rules. On the other hand, however, it could be noted that 
art. 263, par. 5, TFEU simply provides for the possibility of identifying specific 
conditions and modalities for the individual sectors, such as the prior submission to 
an internal appeal committee, without however these modalities or conditions come 
to deny the very possibility of having recourse to the CJEU. The second 
interpretation certainly seems more in line with the spirit of the reform and with the 
general context of the Treaties. 
Given this general classification of the dispute before the Boards of Appeal, it is 
appropriate to examine in more detail the rules concerning their composition. In fact, 
the mechanisms for appointing committee members, the subjective requisites 
required of them, their subsequent status, as well as the choices relating to the 
composition of the judicial colleges reflect the peculiarities of these forms of 
preventive protection and have a significant impact on the level of judicial protection 
offered to operators in the sector. 
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6. Procedure of Appointment of the Members of the Commissions 
The procedure for appointing the members of the Boards of Appeal is not the same 
in all cases and, on the contrary, presents some differences. In the case of EASA, 
ECHA and ACER, it follows that provided for the executive director: The EC then 
draws up a list of names, from which the agency's board of directors chooses and 
appoints the winning candidates. The same procedure also applies in the case of the 
three European Financial Supervision Authorities (ESA), which have a single Joint 
Board of Appeal (where, however, the Executive Director is named differently). In 
the case of ECHA, ACER and the ESAs, it is specified that the EC must draw up the 
list following a public call for expressions of interest published in the Official 
Gazette (Harlow, Rawlings, 2014, pp. 341ss)1 (and “in other media and websites”2, 
further specifies the founding regulation of ECHA), while nothing similar is stated 
in the case of EASA3. The boards of directors of ACER and the ESAs must first 
consult the respective plenary bodies formed by the national independent authorities; 
that in the latter case, given that the Board of Appeal is a joint body of the three 
authorities, each board of directors will appoint one third of the members. 
It is interesting to note that, demonstrating the “internal” nature of the body in 
question, it was possible to raise one or more members of the Board of Appeal from 
carrying out their functions if “serious reasons” are not specified. As regards ACER 
and the ESAs, this power has been attributed to the board of directors, always 
following consultation with the Regulators Committee and the Board of 
Supervisors4; in EASA and ECHA case, however, the same procedure is not followed 
exactly for the appointment of the same members, since any exemption is decided 
by the EC, having heard the opinion of the board of directors5. 
In the OHIM (Grynfogel, 2011, pp. 129ss) and CPVO cases, the first agencies of the 
Union in which appeals committees were set up, the mechanism for appointing 
members is slightly different, since conceptually it is necessary to separate the 
appointment of the Chairman of the Board of Appeal (in case of OHIM, of the Boards 
                                                             
1See art. 18, par. 2 of the ACER settlement regulation; art. 58, par. 3, of the three different founding 
regulations of EBA, EIOPA and ESMA; for ECHA. 
2See art. 89, par. 3, of founding regulation of ECHA. 
3Cfr. art. 41, par. 3, of founding regulation of EASA. 
4See art. 18, par. 3, of the regulation establishing ACER; art. 58, par. 5, of the ESA founding regulations. 
5See art. 90, par. 4 of the ECHA founding regulation and art. 42, par. 4 of the regulation establishing 
EASA. 
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of Appeal, since this agency is the only one to have five different commissions in 
place of one) by the appointment of the other members of the committee. 
In the first case, the Chairman is appointed according to the same procedure as the 
Executive Director, then with a Board decision based on a list of at least three 
candidates prepared by the agency's board of directors1. The members of the various 
boards of appeal and their substitutes are then appointed by the board of directors 
(Busuioc, 2013)2; over the years a practice has been established, to which neither the 
founding regulation of the agency nor the statute of the Boards of Appeal mention, 
so that the decision of the board of directors is anticipated by the consultation of an 
ad hoc committee set up by the same board of directors and usually composed of the 
President or Vice-President of the Agency, the Chairman of the Boards of Appeal, 
the Chairman of the Agency's Board and the Budget Committee, as well as national 
representatives up to a number of 6 or 7 members, making a pre-selection of 
candidates, increasing the impartiality and independence of the candidates who will 
be subsequently appointed3. 
Even in CPVO case, the Chairman of the Board of Appeal (currently only one, 
although the founding regulation of the agency admits that more than one can be 
established4)is appointed by the Council, on the basis of a list proposed by the 
Commission and not by the agency's board of directors (which must, however, have 
to be consulted by the EC)5. This procedure was considered extremely effective in 
assuring the independence of the candidate, but also “time-consuming and 
administratively very heavy to handle”6. The other members of the Board of Appeal 
are then appointed by the President, on the basis of a list drawn up by the Board of 
Directors which in turn acts on the basis of a proposal from the Bureau Agency7. 
The procedure for exempting some members of the commissions from carrying out 
their functions in these two cases is extremely different from the one described 
above, since in these cases the decision is taken by the CJEU, activated by a request 
from the EC following the advice of the Administrative Council (in CPVO case8), or 
by the board of directors acting on the proposal of the Chairman of the Boards of 
                                                             
1See the combined provisions of Articles 136 and 125 of the founding regulation of OHIM. 
2Art. 136, par. 2, of founding regulaton of OHIM. 
3Joint Board n. 10, Boards of appeal, op. cit., 
4Art. 46 of founding regulation of CPVO. 
5Art. 47, par. 1, of founding regulation of CPVO. 
6Joint Board n. 10, Boards of appeal, op. cit., p. 4. 
7See the combined provisions of articles 46, par. 2, and 47, par. 2, of the regulation establishing CPVO. 
8Art. 47, par. 5, of founding regulation of CPVO. 
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Appeal (in the case of OHIM, if the President is to be exonerated, the CJEU is 
referred to the Council1). 
Given the delicacy of the interests at stake, the role of protection of the right 
attributed to CJEU by art. 19 TEU and that of the protection of the general interest 
of the Union assigned instead to the EC by art. 17 TEU, the mechanism envisaged 
in CPVO case seems undoubtedly preferable, especially in comparison with the 
procedures implemented for the most recent, far less guaranteeing committees of 
appeal, despite the greater political relevance of the decisions that they may make 
(think, to example, to complaints against the decisions of the Financial Supervision 
Authorities). 
Lastly, as regards Eurojust and Europol, the appointment of the members- as the 
name of the bodies in question, the “joint supervisory authorities” already suggests- 
is extremely more intergovernmental, with each Member State holding a power to 
appoint one (Eurojust2)or two (Europol3)members, as well as their substitutes, in 
accordance with their national laws. While in the first case it is explicitly stated that 
the same Member States may also revoke the appointment, and not for the “serious 
reasons” envisaged for the other agencies on the basis of revocation principles 
applicable under the domestic law of the Member State of origin, the decision 
establishing Europol does not cover this possibility. 
 
7. Subjective Requirements for the Appointment of Members of the 
Boards of Appeal and their Subsequent Status 
Although the nomination procedures are quite different, in all cases the members of 
the Boards of Appeal must meet a general requirement of independence, affirmed in 
all the founding regulations4 of the agencies and always accompanied by the explicit 
provision of their freedom from any type of education or constraint. Only in the case 
of Eurojust is there a difference, since the requirement of independence is stated in 
a less direct way, asking that the Member States, according to the rules provided in 
                                                             
1Art. 136, par. 1 and 3 of founding regulation of OHIM. 
2Art. 23, par. 1, of founding decision of Eurojust. 
3Article 34, par. 1, of the decision establishing Europol. It is emphasized that, in this case, the members 
of the joint control authority are chosen from among the members of the independent national 
supervisory authority, governed by art. 33 of the same source. 
4art. 18, par. 3, of the regulation establishing ACER; art. 136, par. 4 of the regulation establishing OHIM; 
art. 47, par. 3, of the regulation establishing CPVO; art. 42, par. 2, of the regulation establishing EASA; 
art. 90, par. 2, of the founding regulation of ECHA; art. 59, par. 1, of the founding regulations of the 
three ESAs; art. 34, par. 1, of the decision establishing Europol 
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the respective laws, appoint a judge or a person “who performs functions that give it 
an adequate independence”1. 
The biggest differences are recorded on two fronts: Firstly, on the explicit request 
for technical expertise in the field of operation of the agency. This requirement is 
only found in the founding regulations of ACER2 and the European Financial 
Supervision Authorities (where it is expressed in great detail)3. Secondly, less 
marked differences are found with respect to another requirement (rectius: to a 
corollary of the general title of independence), ie the prohibition to perform other 
duties within the agency. 
This principle is not stated, at the level of the decision establishing the agency, for 
the members of the common control authorities of Europol and Eurojust; however, 
it is mentioned in the statute of the two authorities4. It should be emphasized that in 
any case it would have been substantially implicit, especially in the case of Europol, 
where the members must come from independent national supervisory authorities 
and, consequently, will be persons who are obviously not included in the agency 
staff; in the second case, however, the clarification is of greater importance, in 
particular in relation to the more general requirement, just examined, of a person 
“who exercises functions that confer an adequate independence”5. Vice versa, in the 
founding regulations of all the other agencies, it is stated that “the members of the 
Boards of Appeal can not perform other functions in the agency”6;in some cases, 
however, it is added that “members of the Board of Appeal may be employed on a 
part-time basis”7, probably because in some cases the Boards of Appeal have a 
workload that allows ad hoc meetings. An example in itself and particularly 
interesting is that of OHIM, where the principle under consideration is affirmed in a 
less incisive way. The relevant founding regulation, in fact, does not state a general 
prohibition, but an exclusion from certain positions: “the chairman of the Boards of 
Appeal, as well as the chairmen and members of the individual Boards of Appeal can 
                                                             
1Art. 23, par. 1, of the founding decision of Eurojust, par. 3. 
2Art. 18, par. 1, of founding regulation of ACER. 
3Art. 58, par. 2, of the founding regulations of ESA. 
4Article 3, par. 4 of the Joint Supervisory Authority Act of 23 June 2009, cited above; art. 4, par. 2, of 
the Joint Supervisory Authority Act of June 22, 2009, op. cit. 
5Art. 23, par. 1, of the founding decision of Eurojust. 
6Article 90, par. 3, of the founding regulation of ECHA; cfr. also art. 18, par. 3, of the regulation 
establishing ACER and art. 59, par. 1, of the founding regulations of the three ESAs, which express the 
same concept with different words. 
7Art. 42, par. 3, of the regulation establishing EASA; analogy, art. 47, par. 4 of the regulation 
establishing CPVO. 
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not be examiners or members of the opposition divisions, of the legal and 
administrative division of european trade marks and models or cancellation 
divisions”1. 
This point is particularly interesting given that, precisely in relation to OHIM, during 
the negotiations of the joint declaration concerns were raised that many members of 
the Boards of Appeal had previously worked within the agency itself, also in of 
numerous difficulties encountered in recruiting sufficiently qualified personnel but 
without previous ties with other agency administrative offices2. 
In this regard, the joint declaration stated that “the recruitment of members of the 
boards of appeal between the staff of the agency and/or the members of the board of 
the agency dealt with very cautiously and (without) putting in discussion of the 
aforementioned principles of impartiality and independence”3. The terms used are 
not without doubt the strongest, but we must also consider that, even with regard to 
the experience of OHIM, there have not yet been any problems of poor impartiality4. 
This is due to the presence of detailed rules that further regulate the independence, 
transparency and possible conflicts of interests of the members of the Boards of 
Appeal, as well as the possibility of their abstention and recusal by the applicants 
(the latter, however, not provided for in the joint control authorities of Eurojust and 
Europol). It is hardly necessary to point out, as a further demonstration of the hybrid 
nature of these commissions, that these provisions are not, however, accompanied 
by the attribution to the members of the commissions of a status comparable to that 
of the CJEU judges: In particular, the strengthening the immunity of jurisdiction that 
members of the Boards of Appeal derive from their membership of the agency's staff 
(and thus, consequently, from the application of Protocol no. 7 on the privileges and 
immunities of the European Union) (Harlow, Rawlings, 2014), and which, however, 
in the absence of specific provisions, remains without the ad hoc discipline 
envisaged, in the case of the Luxembourg courts, by art. 3 of the Statute of the CJEU. 
The members of the Boards of Appeal therefore merely benefit from “functional” 
immunity, like any other Union official, and not from full immunity from civil and 
criminal jurisdiction, which is reserved for the courts of Luxembourg. 
                                                             
1Art. 136, par. 5, of the dounding regulation of OHIM. 
2Joint Board n. 10, Boards of appeal, cit., p. 6. 
3Joint Declaration by the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European 
Commission on Decentralized Agencies, 19 July 2012, cited above, point II.21 
4Detail From n. 10, Boards of appeal, cit., p. 6. 
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8. Composition of the Boards of Appeal 
Usually, the boards of appeal are made up of three members (one president, two 
members and their substitutes): This scheme is found in the committees of ECHA1, 
EASA2 and CPVO3. 
In the case of OHIM, the three-member commission is the standard situation; 
however, if the questions of law are particularly complex or particularly important 
cases, the possibility of assigning the appeal to an extended committee, made up of 
nine members, is also envisaged. This solution was devised to reduce the risk of 
jurisprudential contrasts between the individual commissions (in fact, it is recalled 
that OHIM is the only agency to have more than one appeal committee); however, 
the appeal to the enlarged commission was extremely sporadic, officially due to the 
desire not to lengthen the procedure, so that today the problem can not be considered 
completely solved4. On the contrary, for the solution of questions of law or of fact 
that do not raise particular difficulties, or when the cause is of limited importance, a 
single-judge judge is competent. 
In Eurojust, the situation is slightly different, since the joint supervisory authority is 
made up of three permanent members, to which one or more ad hoc members should 
be added, solely for the duration of the examination of an appeal concerning personal 
data from the Member State that appointed them. The other agencies devolve from 
the general composition to three members; specifically, the common supervisory 
authority of Europol is formed, as already mentioned5, by at least two representatives 
to each Member State, to which the respective substitutes must be added. Unlike the 
homologous body of Eurojust, there is no system of three fixed members, but rather 
a committee formed by half the members of the authority (ie one representative per 
Member State, with the respective substitute)6. The Board of Appeal of ACER and 
                                                             
1Art. 89 of the founding regulation of ECHA. See also from Ombusman the FDecision in case 
1606/2013/AN on how the European Chemicals Agency applies rules concerning animal testing of 11 
September 2015 
2Art. 41 of the founding regulation of EASA. 
3Article 46 of the founding regulation of CPVO; note well that, pursuant to par. 3 of the same article, 
in case of need the committee can also avail of two additional members (that is, the two substitutes). 
4Detail From n. 10, Boards of appeal, cit., p. 3. 
5Art. 23 of the dounding decision of Eurojust, par. 4. 
6Article 34, par. 8 of the Europol decision establishing the company, as well as articles 12 and ss. of the 
rules of procedure of the joint supervisory authority, adopted by act no. 29/2009 of the Europol Joint 
Supervisory Authority of June 22, 2009. 
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the joint Board of the three Financial Supervision Authorities are instead composed 
of six members, plus their respective substitutes. 
The mandate of all members of the Boards of Appeal and of the Joint Supervisory 
Body of Europol is five years; for the Eurojust homologous body, however, the term 
of office is three years (for fixed members) and at least three years (for all others)1. 
It is always renewable, and only in the case of the joint commission of the Financial 
Supervision Authorities is specified for a single time2. 
Finally, with regard to voting, special rules are provided in only two cases: In the 
Joint Supervisory Authority of Eurojust, since with the entry of an ad hoc judge the 
body can be composed of four members, in case the vote of the president3 is decisive; 
in the Joint Board of Appeals of the ESAs, the majority must include at least one of 
the two members appointed by the respondent authority4. 
 
9. (Follows) What about the Administrative Appeal before the European 
Commission? 
The second modality of access to forms of preventive protection for the appeal before 
the CJEU consists in an “administrative appeal” (as defined in the founding 
regulation of one of the agencies that provide it5), presented before the EC. Unlike 
the Boards of Appeal, whose function can be framed in the paradigm of adjudication, 
in the case under consideration the EC exercises rather a role of implementation of 
the agencies' decisions, especially in cases-in truth, marginal-in which it enjoys 
power to amend the contested act (Craig, 2018, pp. 65ss; Żurek, 2011, pp. 253ss; 
Weismann, 2016; Basakić, Božina Beroš, 2017, pp. 1746ss)6. For this reason, the 
administrative appeal does not seem to be framed among the “specific conditions 
and modalities” that, pursuant to art. 263, par. 5, TFEU can be contained in the 
agencies' institutional deeds to accompany the appeals for annulment proposed by 
natural and legal persons. Rather, it seems to be due to the principle of good 
administration consecrated to art. 298 TFEU, being a mechanism that-although not 
                                                             
1Art. 23, par. 1 and 3 of the founding decision of Eurojust. 
2Art. 58, par. 4, of the founding regulations of ESA. 
3Art. 23, par. 6, of the founding decision of Eurojust. 
4Art. 58, par. 6, of the founding regulations of ESA. 
5Art. 28, par. 4, of the founding regulation of European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control 
(ECDC). 
6Art. 22, par. 3 of Council Regulation (EC) No 58/2003 of 19 December 2002 laying down the statute 
for executive agencies to be entrusted with certain tasks in the management of european programmes, 
OJ L 11, 16.1.2003, p. 1-8. 
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explicitly referred to by the law-contributes to the pursuit of the objectives of 
opening, effectiveness and independence of the European administration (Harlow, 
Rawlings, 2014.). 
Unlike what is observed in relation to the Boards of Appeal, the experiment of the 
administrative appeal before the EC seems not to be understood as a conditio sine 
qua non of the possibility of syndicating the same act or conduct before the CJEU. 
It is true that, on the one hand, the role attributed at this juncture to the EC indicates 
a precise hierarchical and functional relationship that deserves to be respected and 
not bypassed, especially in light of the fact that the decision of the EC is, however, 
challengeable in front of the CJEU. On the other hand, however, it should be noted 
that in these cases the EC does not have the power to suspend the execution of the 
acts of the agencies considered to be harmful, instead expressly provided in the 
similar case of the executive agencies. Therefore, given the already mentioned 
importance of precautionary protection in the system of European litigation, it seems 
to be possible to claim that the applicant can legitimately apply directly to the CJEU 
of the European Union in order to avoid jeopardizing his situation pending the 
administrative procedure. 
Returning to the examination of the administrative appeal, which in fact consists of 
a hierarchical administrative appeal, it should be noted that it was proposed 
according to three different models. The first is curiously provided for only a few 
agencies, all with consultative and informative powers, but not even the most 
incisive: The European Center for the Development of Vocational Training, the 
European Agency for Safety and Health at Work, the Foundation European Union 
for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions and the European Center for 
Disease Prevention and Control. The second one, totally overlapping with that 
foreseen for the executive agencies1, can be found in the cases of the two European 
Offices for plant varieties and for brands, designs and models. The third one, which 
together presents some fundamental characteristics of the first two, can be found in 
relation to the European Food Safety Authority. 
According to the first model, the active legitimates are the Member States, the 
members of the Board of Directors and the third parties directly and individually 
concerned; these subjects are therefore entitled to refer before the EC any act of the 
agencies, explicit or implicit, with a view to checking its legitimacy. The deadline is 
                                                             
1See the art. 18 of the regulation establishing CEDEFOP; art. 22 of the founding regulation of European 
Agency for Safety and Health at Work (EU-OSHA); art. 22 of the founding regulation of European 
Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (EUROFOUND). 
ACTA UNIVERSITATIS DANUBIUS                                       Vol. 11, no. 1/2019 
158 
always fifteen days, starting from the day on which the complainant became aware 
of the contested measure. The EC then makes a decision within a month; the lack of 
decisions within this deadline is to be considered as an implied rejection decision. It 
should be noted that the EC can not request changes to the act, but only cancel it or 
confirm it in full, in order to protect the independence of the agencies1. 
The European Center for Disease Prevention and Control diverges partially from this 
scheme, thus constituting a variant to the first model, for two reasons. The first is 
that its founding regulation expressly states that the explicit or implicit decision to 
reject the administrative appeal by the EC can be challenged by annulment before 
the CJEU, pursuant to art. 263 TFEU2.This specification, however, does not really 
seem to imply a different situation from that of the other three agencies, since even 
in those cases it is unlikely that the decision of the EC will be held to be contestable 
by the CJEU, since it constitutes a clearly productive act of legal proceedings for the 
appellant3. 
Rather, a slightly different situation between the Center and the other agencies seems 
to be created due to the second reason for divergence, namely due to the fact that, to 
be precise, the regulation of the first includes, among the legitimated assets, those 
third parties “directly and personally concerned”4. The adverb “individually”, clearly 
borrowed from art. 263, par. 4, TFEU, has therefore been replaced by “personal” 
(Harlow, Rawlings, 2014; Basakić, Božina Beroš, 2017): The difference is certainly 
slight, but, moreover, according to the well-known Plaumann jurisprudence, the 
concept of “individually” is able to identify a sphere of subjects slightly larger than 
that of those who personally received the act5. It seems therefore possible to argue 
that, in the case of the Center alone, the administrative appeal can be experienced by 
a slightly more limited category of subjects than that of those to whom such a remedy 
is granted in the cases of other agencies. 
In any case, the possibility of appeal to the CJEU would not seem to undergo 
significant changes. The only difference would be that, in the case of the Center, the 
appeal should be experienced directly against the agency's act, by all those excluded 
from the possibility of administrative appeal; in the case of the other agencies, 
                                                             
1Art. 28, par. 4, of founding regulation of ECDC. 
2CRAIG, 2010, pp. 94ss. 
3Art. 28, par. 4, of founding regulation of ECDC. 
4CJEU, 25/62, Plaumann und Co. v. Commission of the EEC of 15 July 1963, ECLI:EU:C:1963:17, I-
00199. 
5Art. 122 of founding regulation of OHIM. 
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however, the appeal would be made by directly challenging the decision of implied 
or explicit rejection of the EC. The second model of administrative appeal to the EC 
is that foreseen for OHIM1 and for the European Plant Variety Office, which, as 
discussed above, are already equipped with an internal appeal board which acts as 
the first filter before a possible appeal at the CJEU. In both cases, EC is given a 
residual power to check the legitimacy of the acts carried out by the President of the 
Office for which European law does not provide for control of legitimacy by another 
body, as well as the acts of the committee of balance. Thus a model of administrative 
appeal is decidedly different from that already described, also in its variants, in 
relation to the four agencies mentioned above. 
In fact, at this juncture the EC has a coercive power over the most marked agencies, 
being able to demand not only the revocation, but also the modification of the deeds 
considered illegitimate. Furthermore, this power of control can also be exercised ex 
officio by the EC, or referred to it by any Member State or by any person directly 
and individually concerned. In the case of the Plant Variety Office alone, the 
members of the board of directors are among the legitimates who are active in the 
appeal. In any case, the person concerned must refer the EC within one month (in 
the case of the Trade Mark Office, designs and models) or two months (in the case 
of the Office of Plant Varieties), starting from the day on which it became known of 
the act in question. The EC takes a decision within, respectively, three or two months; 
the lack of a decision within this deadline is to be considered as an implied rejection 
decision.  
Lastly, the European Food Safety Authority, only in certain cases, is subject to a form 
of administrative review by the Commission which mixes the fundamental 
characteristics of the two models examined so far. In this case, first of all, there is a 
fundamental difference whereby the regulation establishing the authority does not 
provide for explicit forms of revision by the EC, this possibility being instead 
envisaged in other derivative legislation. To be precise, these are the regulations 
governing two specific procedures in which the authority is involved, namely those 
for assessing the safety of additives for animal feed2 and genetically modified food 
and feed (Craig, Hofmann, Schneider, 2017; Lodge, Wegrich, 2012, pp. 268ss)3. 
                                                             
1Art. 122 of founding regulation of OHIM. 
2Art. 19 of Regulation (EC) No 1831/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 
September 2003 on additives for use in animal nutrition, OJ L 268, 18.10.2003, p. 29-43. 
3Art. 36 of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 
September 2003 on genetically modified food and feed OJ L 268, 18.10.2003, p. 1-23; Regulation (EC) 
No 298/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2008 amending Regulation 
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In both of these cases, decisions or omissions of actions by virtue of the powers 
conferred on the authority may be reviewed by the EC on its own initiative (as in the 
second model) or following a request from a Member State or any person directly 
and individually interested. For the purpose presented a request to the EC within two 
months from the day on which the interested party became aware of the act or 
omission in question: Also the time limit for the appeal, therefore, is borrowed from 
the second model of administrative review. The EC, which takes a decision within 
two months, can however ask the authority only to withdraw its decision or to 
remedy the omission, without being able to oblige the latter to make simple changes, 
thus taking up the approach described in the first model. 
 
10. Details of Additional Rules Relating to the Regulation of Contractual 
and Extra-Contractual Liability 
Before concluding the analysis of the particular provisions contained in the 
individual founding acts, it is appropriate to briefly describe the situation concerning 
the contractual and extra-contractual responsibility of the agencies. Almost all the 
agencies answer for both, while some answer only for one or the other, with only the 
European Police College that does not provide, in its decision establishing, the 
possibility to answer for either of them. The contractual liability of the agencies is 
always governed by the law of the contract in question; only the instruments 
establishing the Agency for the Cooperation of National Energy Regulators, the 
Body of European Regulators of Electronic Communications, the three Financial 
Supervision Authorities and, of course, the European Police College do not provide 
for it. In all other cases, when foreseen, the CJEU is always called to know the 
relative causes, except in a few cases where this possibility is not expressly foreseen1. 
The referral to the courts of Luxembourg, however, takes place through arbitration 
clauses, which are usually mandatory, except in some cases, where the presence of 
such a clause (and therefore, consequently, the competence of the CJEU) is given 
only as probable2. In addition to the College of Police, all three agencies operating 
                                                             
(EC) No 1829/2003 on genetically modified food and feed, as regards the implementing powers 
conferred on the Commission, OJ L 97, 9.4.2008, p. 64-66. 
1See art. 21 of the Regulation (CE) n. 58/2003, op. cit., as well as ETFs (Article 22 of its Founding 
Regulation), EUISS (Article 16 of its Establishment Act), EUSC (Article 18 of its Establishment Act), 
Eurojust (Article 27c of its Establishing Decision) and Europol (Article 53 of his founding decision). 
2The referral of the dispute concerning contractual liability to the CJEU is only possible in the cases of 
ECHA (Article 101 of its Founding Regulation), EDA (Article 27 of its Establishing Decision), EFCA 
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in the CFSP sector are not liable for non-contractual liability. However, all the other 
agencies of the European Union do; non-contractual liability is always governed, 
according to the classical expression of art. 340 TFEU, “in accordance with the 
general principles common to the Member States”; only in the cases of Europol and 
Eurojust it is dictated “by the laws of the Member States”1. This difference seems, 
in truth, more of form than of substance, but it is nevertheless indicative of the more 
intergovernmental nature of these organs, which are the only ones that provide for 
an extra-contractual responsibility not to belong to the former European pillar. As 
further evidence of their specificity, Europol and Eurojust, this time accompanied by 
the Agency for the Cooperation of National Energy Regulators2, are the only cases 
in which the CJEU's competence to know the causes of liability is not expressly 
provided for non-contractual activity of the agencies. 
 
11. Some Unresolved Problems: Control of Non-Binding Documents 
The Lisbon Treaty has solved many problems relating to the possibility of 
challenging the acts of binding agencies. Agencies often influence the decision-
making process of the Union through soft-law acts (Maggetti, Gilardi, 2014, pp. 
1294ss), with respect to which the breadth of control powers attributed to the CJEU 
is drastically reduced, especially when the claimant is a natural or legal person. In 
this regard, bearing in mind the categories of soft-law acts, it is noted that the most 
problematic issues arise in relation to semi-binding opinions and to the so-called 
“comply or explain guidelines”3. 
As far as the former are concerned, a problem can be posed of the effectiveness of 
judicial review: In this context, in fact, the economic operators challenge the final 
act of the procedure, which is the decision adopted by the EC addressed to them. The 
content of the latter, however, is strongly influenced by the opinion of the agency, 
which is its logical and scientific basis. The opinion, however, may not be subject to 
the control of the judicial authority, since it is an endoprocedimental act or because 
of its formally non-binding nature. This situation, which has occurred in the 
                                                             
(Article 21 of its Founding Regulation), EMSA (Article 8 of its founding regulation), ERA (Article 34 
of its founding regulation). 
1Art. 27 of the founding decision of Eurojust and art. 53 of the Europol ruling. 
2Art. 29 of founding regulation of ACER. 
3joined cases T-74/00, T-76/00, T-83/00, T-84/00, T-85/00, T-132/00, T-137/00 and T-141/00, Artegodan 
GmbH and others v. Commission of 26 November 2002, ECLI:EU:T:2002:283, II-04945, parr. 199-
200. 
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procedure of authorization of drugs but could also arise in relation to other semi-
binding opinions, could thus give rise to a problem of amplitude of the judicial 
review, which may greatly limit the possibilities for applicant to challenge the logical 
and scientific basis of the contested measure. 
With regard to the opinions issued by the aforementioned European Medicines 
Agency, the GC solved the problem in 2002, in the Artegodan case, stating that “the 
european judicature may be called upon to exercise its control, on the one hand, on 
the extrinsic legitimacy of the scientific advice (from the European Medicines 
Agency) and, secondly, on the exercise by the EC of its discretionary power”1. 
However, “the court can not substitute its own assessment for that of the European 
Medicines Agency”. In fact, judicial review is exercised only on the regularity of the 
work (of the European Medicines Agency), as well as on internal consistency and on 
the grounds of its opinion, with regard to the latter aspect, the court is only entitled 
to check whether the opinion contains a statement of reasons enabling an assessment 
to be made of the considerations on which it is based and whether it establishes a 
comprehensible link between medical examinations and science and the conclusions 
reached2. 
This restriction of the field of cognition of the judicial body, typical of all the systems 
related to the revision of discretionary administrative acts connoted by strong 
elements of technical or scientific specificity, is also explained by the already 
described internal review system of the opinion of the agency (rectius: of the internal 
scientific committee) which allows the interested party to obtain a second opinion 
from a different rapporteur. This mechanism that guarantees a double pronunciation 
is “one of the most suitable protection tools” and “plays a compensatory role 
compared to the limited extent of the European judge's union on technical issues” 
(Birkinshaw, Varney (a cura di), 2010). 
An equally limited union is also found in other sectors where the opinion review 
system is not more hierarchical-administrative than technical, involving the EC: This 
is what happens, for example, in food, according to the third model of administrative 
appeal, already described above. In this area the review of the opinions of the Food 
                                                             
1See, joined cases T-74/00, T-76/00, T-83/00, T-84/00, T-85/00, T-132/00, T-137/00 and T-141/00, 
Artegodan GmbH and others v. Commission of 26 November 2002, op. cit. 
2See, joined cases T-74/00, T-76/00, T-83/00, T-84/00, T-85/00, T-132/00, T-137/00 and T-141/00, 
Artegodan GmbH and others v. Commission of 26 November 2002, op. cit. In the same orientation see 
also the case: T-326/99, Nancy Fern Olivieri v. Commission and EMEA of 18 December 2003, 
ECLI:EU:T:2003:351, II-6053. 
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Safety Agency seems to have never been in question, since the CJEU submits them 
to its control as “conducting a scientific assessment of the risks as comprehensive as 
possible, on the basis of scientific advice based on the principles of excellence, 
transparency and independence, constitutes a relevant procedural guarantee in order 
to ensure the scientific objectivity of the measures and to avoid the adoption of 
arbitrary measures”1.However, the judges themselves stated that “it is not for the 
court to assess the merits of one or the other scientific position defended before it, or 
to substitute its own assessment for that of the european Institutions to which that 
task has been assigned exclusively from the Treaty”2. 
The situation of the agencies now referred to be not so different from what has 
already been analyzed in relation to other semi-binding opinions, in particular those 
of the European Financial Supervision Authorities for the adoption of delegated and 
implementing acts by the EC (Busuioc, 2013)3. However, by constituting acts with a 
more general content and not taken position with respect to individual requests, they 
do not provide for mechanisms of preventive appeals by third parties. Consequently, 
given the general heterogeneity between the various EU agencies, it is difficult to 
say to what extent the approach taken in the above cases can be applied in other areas 
of EU law. Surely, it constitutes a precedent that deserves to be recalled whenever 
the logical-scientific bases of an act escape from the scrutiny of the judge as 
contained in a formally non-contestable act; moreover, it seems that the depth of this 
scrutiny must be greater the more they are missing, during the procedure of adoption 
of the opinion, the instruments that would allow the interested parties to assert their 
position. 
However, it should also be pointed out that requiring the Luxembourg courts to have 
a detailed control of the semi-binding opinions of the agencies could prove 
counterproductive, because they do not have the specific technical skills required for 
the individual sectors necessary to fully assess the correctness of the logical process 
followed by the agency. In this sense, therefore, the provision of internal review 
                                                             
1See, T-13/99, Pfizer Animal Health v. Council of 11 September 2002, ECLI:EU:T:2002:209, II-03305, 
par. 172. 
2T-13/99, Pfizer Animal Health v. Council of 11 September 2002, op. cit. 
3The forecast of a penetrating control by commissions of experts other than those who have adopted 
the opinion challenged and independent of the agency of reference, even though hinged on it, it seems 
that it could also resolve the objection raised by Busuioc: “(...) while experts are sitting in the chair of 
the decision-makers, neither the Commission nor the Court is in a position to scrutinize the measures 
they adopt”. In fact, from the vicious circle pointed out by the author seems to be able to get out only 
by offering the possibility of further technical-scientific control, of merit, however appealable for 
reasons of law before the CJEU. 
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mechanisms or prior consultation of the interested parties would seem to be a 
fundamental aspect to be added to the possibility of judicial review, in order to 
guarantee better protection of the interested parties (Senden, Van Der Brink, 2012). 
On the other hand, as regards the “comply or explain” guidelines, the problems of 
judicial protection are upstream of the magnitude of the judges' union, since only the 
admissibility of an action for their annulment is problematic. In fact, these deeds are 
not transposed into a binding document and must therefore be challenged 
independently. As is known, no clear jurisprudence has yet been formulated by the 
CJEU regarding the appealability of soft-law proceedings; in particular, the 
interpretation of art. 263 TFEU and the fact that the contestability should be 
guaranteed only for acts intended to produce legal effects (through a literal 
interpretation) or to all those who actually produce them, regardless of whether they 
have been designed or not for that purpose (Senden, 2004, pp. 112ss). Obviously, the 
second option would allow to extend the judicial review also to protect those legal 
situations created by soft law acts which, as such, are contained “in instruments that 
have not been attributed legally binding force as such”1. 
In this regard, it is interesting to underline once again a particular situation, again 
related to the European Medicines Agency, which presents an interesting starting 
point: Its Board of Directors has defined the guidelines issued by the agency as “soft 
law” (with a) non-legally binding but almost binding character that can derive from 
the legal basis when the guideline intends to specify how to fulfill legal obligation2. 
In a sense, it seems to be recognized by the agency itself as the purpose of its 
guidelines to produce legal effects, at least in the case where there is a close 
relationship between them and an obligation already enshrined in a binding legal 
instrument. This recognition could therefore increase the chances of admissibility of 
an appeal against a guideline of the Medicines Agency. 
In any case, it should be remembered that to date there has been no recourse against 
acts of the second category. This is probably explained by the fact that the applicants 
prefer to wait for a binding decision (it is good to remember that both the European 
Financial Supervision Authorities and the European Aviation Safety Agency can also 
issue binding individual decisions) that oblige them to take a specific course of 
                                                             
1EUROPEAN MEDICINE AGENCY, Procedure for European Union Guidelines and Related 
Documents within the Pharmaceutical Legislative Framework, 18 March 2009, Doc. Ref. 
EMEA/P/24143/2004 Rev. 1 corr.p. 4. 
2EUROPEAN MEDICINE AGENCY, Procedure for European Union Guidelines and Related 
Documents within the Pharmaceutical Legislative Framework, 18 March 2009, op. cit. 
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action, rather than immediately bring an action which the EU judicature would 
probably declare inadmissible. 
 
12. The activity of Control over the Acts and Behavior of the Agencies by 
the European Ombudsman 
We need to look at the protection guaranteed by the European Ombudsman; it can 
also be invoked against the work of the agencies and, although it does not have a 
jurisdictional nature, it constitutes an instrument of control that should not be 
underestimated. 
Before the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the discipline now provided for 
by art. 228 TFEU was the main form of protection in relation to those agencies for 
which no control mechanisms had been established for internal committees or the 
EC. The control of cases of maladministration by the European Ombudsman 
(Vogiatzis, 2017, pp. 38ss) has been, since the beginning of the institution, extended 
not only to the european Institutions, but also to the organs formed by the latter 
through acts of secondary law (as evidenced by the letter of article 138 E of the 
Maastricht Treaty) (Vogiatzis, 2017). In any case, the powers of the Ombudsman are 
however significantly less incisive than those of the CJEU, since it simply has the 
possibility of facilitating a consensual resolution of the problem by investing the 
body complained of by the applicant and leaving the first 3 months for communicate 
your opinion on the problem; if not satisfied by the opinion received from the 
administration concerned, the European Ombudsman can only, as extrema ratio, send 
a report to the European Parliament, which may also contain ad hoc (non-binding) 
recommendations for the resolution of the case, also copying the complainant and 
the body involved1. However, the Ombudsman tried not to inflict the use of this 
power (Hofmann, Ziller, 2017), using only in cases where the Parliament had an 
effective power of persuasion on the body complained of, to avoid the political 
importance of this instrument of pressure (Busuioc, 2012, pp. 228ss). 
In the concept of “mal administration” (Kristjàndòttir, 2013, pp. 238ss; Ashagbor, 
Countouris, Lianos, 2012; Jones, Menon, Weatherill, 2012; Hofmann, Ziller, 2017; 
Mir Puigpelat, 2010, pp. 150ss),which essentially limits the scope of the 
Ombudsman, it should be understood “tant des actes ou comportements illégaux que 
                                                             
1Art. 8, par. 4 of the European Parliament Decision with which the European Ombudsman adopts the 
implementing provisions, 8 July 2002, subsequently amended by decision of the Ombudsman himself 
on 3 December 2008. 
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des actes ou comportements simplement inopportuns qui, sans violer de règles 
juridiques, ne répondent pas aux critices de transparence et d'efficacité” (Simoncini, 
2018). Therefore, this instrument of protection can well be seen as a parallel and 
complementary remedy to those examined above: Parallel, because it allows to unify 
any illegal acts or behaviors carried out by the agencies, with powers certainly less 
incisive than those attributed to the courts of Luxembourg but at the same time, much 
more easily operated by individuals, since the complaint to the Ombudsman does not 
know the strict limits set by art. 263, par. 4, TFUE (Kaczorowska-Ireland, 2016; 
Martucci, 2017; Scholten, 2014, pp. 1227ss); complementary, precisely because it 
makes it possible to expand the meshes of the control of the lawfulness of the 
agencies' work and, at the same time, offers a protection tool also against those acts 
or behaviors that are fully legitimate from a formal-juridical point of view, but not 
from the substantial-social one (Weiler, 1988, pp. 333ss; Van Raepenbusch, 2016; 
Lavergne, 2018). 
The European Ombudsman dealt with EU agencies, especially with regard to 
complaints about staff management; however, a number of cases also concerned 
issues relating to access to documents or work documents of the agency (Busuioc, 
2012, pp. 228ss). To a lesser extent, the Ombudsman also addressed complaints 
relating to the work of the agencies in their respective sectors: For example, against 
the European Aviation Safety Agency, the Ombudsman made a complaint for an 
alleged lack of legal basis for a decision on the certification of airworthiness of 
aircraft1 and in another concerning a proposal for a navigability directive2. In both 
cases, the cases were closed after the agency had withdrawn or changed the act 
challenged by the complainant and the subject of the Ombudsman's request for an 
opinion. 
The Ombudsman also dealt with the issue of fundamental rights, in particular by 
appealing to Frontex (on his own initiative, not on complaint) (Rijpma, 2012, pp. 
87ss; Peers, 2011) the lack of an internal mechanism for handling complaints of 
alleged fundamental rights injuries in the performance of his duties3. This decision 
is particularly interesting because it has been the subject of a report to the European 
Parliament, called to operate that mechanism of political persuasion to which the 
                                                             
1Decision of the European Ombudsman on complaint 1103/2006/BU against the European Aviation 
Safety Agency, 1 August 2007. 
2Decision of the European Ombudsman on complaint 407/2010/(FS) BEH against the European 
Aviation Safety Agency, 23 November 2010. 
3Draft recommendation of the European Ombudsman in his own initiative inquiry OI/5/2012/BEH-
MHZ against FRONTEX, 9 April 2013. 
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Ombudsman usually uses only a few cases1. The one just mentioned is not the only 
case in which the Ombudsman has investigated agencies even on his own initiative 
and not on behalf of third parties: In particular, this has happened in order to make 
access to documents more efficient and transparent2, the regulation concerning age 
limits in the selection of personnel and the adoption of the Code of Good 
Administrative Behavior3. This latest survey has also led to the drafting of a special 
report for the European Parliament4, similar to what has recently happened with 
Frontex. Among other things, a further investigation is currently under way by the 
Ombudsman of his own interest, addressed to all the agencies and still in the 
interlocutory phase, which deals with the practices of the latter in relation to public 
disclosure of the names of the members of the Staff Selection Committees (Busuioc, 
2012, pp. 242, 243)5. 
Finally, the analysis of the mechanisms of control of the Ombudsman's work 
deserves a brief mention of the recent practice, started in 2011, of the visit to the 
agencies. This control tool, which is not yet structured, allows the Ombudsman to 
control “the field” the work of the agencies and can be seen as an activity connected 
both to the analysis of private complaints, which prodromica to the initiation of 
independent investigations. 
 
13. The Uncertainties about the Future of the Agencies and the Need for 
a Multi-Agent Model 
The competences recognized by the EC in the execution of Union law imply that 
these discretionary powers must nevertheless be placed within precise limits 
(Egeberg, Trondal, 2017, pp. 680ss)6 which, although in the course of implementing 
acts could also be less penetrating than those recorded so far, do not appear however 
allow agencies to exercise that regulatory role by several parties required. 
                                                             
1Decision of the European Ombudsman in his own initiative inquiry OI/1/99/IJH to Europol, 12 July 
2000. 
2Decision of the European Ombudsman in his own initiative inquiry OI/2/2001/(BB) OV, 27 June 2002. 
Decision of the European Ombudsman closing the inquiry into complaint 1561/2014/MHZ against the 
European Banking Authority (EBA) of 06 July 2015. 
3Decision of the European Ombudsman in his own initiative inquiry OI/1/98/OV, 5 February 2002. 
4Special Report by the European Ombudsman to the European Parliament in his own initiative inquiry 
OI/1/98/OV, 11 April 2000 
5OI /4/2013/CK survey on the initiative of the European Ombudsman, started on 12 August 2013. 
6As we can see in the case from CJEU: C-270/12 UK v. Parliament and Council of 22 January 2014, 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:18, published in the electronic Reports of the cases. 
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Nevertheless, in many areas of EU law, the agencies have been given a very 
significant level of incisiveness on the decision-making process, which raises many 
doubts of compatibility with the Treaties and which can also be taken as a sign of the 
future will of the legislator to expand the role of agencies. 
There are other signs that seem to go in the latter direction, but not so much related 
to the agencies as such, but related to the broader scale of renewal that seems to 
affect the governance of the Union as a whole (Rittberg, Wonka, 2013, pp. 132ss). 
The strengthening of the agencies, in fact, also requires a strengthening of the 
political component of the Union executive: The regulatory agencies, by their nature, 
imply the presence of a strong political power, because otherwise they would 
degenerate into a bypass of the democratic method and in an excessive fragmentation 
of executive power; vice versa, political authorities also need agencies, to intercept 
technical and scientific expertise and, according to the still prevailing doctrines of 
New Public Management, to allow the adoption of unpopular political choices and 
make administration more efficient (Rittberg, Wonka, 2013). 
The main example of the reform trends of existing institutional balances, which 
could benefit from a parallel development of the agencies, is that related to the 
change in the role of the EC. In fact, there is a slow tendency towards politicization 
of the latter: In addition to the mechanisms of trust with the Parliament already 
introduced by the Maastricht Treaty and the practices of the auditions of individual 
Commissioners by the competent committees of the Parliament , the Treaty of Lisbon 
has now added that the President of the EC should be chosen “taking into account 
the elections of the European Parliament” and be “elected” by the latter (article 17, 
paragraph 7, TEU) (Rittberg, Wonka, 2013). Furthermore, the political parties of the 
European Parliament have committed themselves to “appointing their respective EC 
presidential candidates sufficiently in advance of the elections so as to enable them 
to organize a meaningful European-wide campaign focusing on European issues 
based on the program of the party and on that of the EC presidential candidate 
proposed by the party”1. 
The problem, however, is that these signs of reform of the governance of the Union 
are not at all unique. In fact, the Lisbon Treaty itself has also strengthened the role 
of the European Council, endowing it with a stable President and, above all, 
                                                             
1European Parliament resolution of 4 July 2013 on improving practical arrangements for the 2014 
European elections, 2013/2102 (INI), par. 5. 
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explicitly stating that it has powers of direction and definition of the Union's 
guidelines and its general political priorities (article 15, par. 1, TEU), 
“contaminating”, even officially, the EC monopoly in the legislative initiative 
(Ponzano, Hermanin, Corona, 2012).Furthermore, in response to the current 
financial crisis, clearly intergovernmental logic was followed, as demonstrated, for 
example, by the experience of the European Stability Mechanism, which gave the 
Board the decision-making powers to manage it. 
Thus, there is certainly a process of reform of the governance of the Union, even if 
it is still unclear whether a strong political center will be created and what will be 
this center; the perspective seems to be that of a persistent fragmentation of the 
European executive. To date it is difficult to take a position on the possibilities of a 
future strengthening of the Union agencies, because the margins of development of 
these organisms depend strongly on the forms, modalities and the very possibility of 
a more political characterization of the Union. For the moment, therefore, it should 
be noted that the current situation is characterized by a strong confusion regarding 
the limits of the powers conferred to the agencies and the methods of control of the 
same. The current challenge, waiting for the indecision on the future of European 
governance to resolve, seems to be to harmonize the plurality of actors involved in 
the implementation of EU law. 
The relationships arising from a delegation of powers between two or more subjects 
are usually traced back into the so-called “principal-agent theory”, a doctrine 
originally born in the economic sciences to explain (rectius: organize) the contractual 
relations “between two (or more) parties when or as the representative of the 
principal” (Ross, 1973, pp. 134ss.). This theory, then applied also in political and 
juridical sciences, has also been widely used in the European Union's legal system 
(Maher, Billiet, Hodson, 2009, pp. 410ss; Kassim, Menon, 2003, pp. 122ss), which 
by its nature is based on opposing interests and on the attribution of powers by 
sovereign subjects to subordinate subjects. 
In the context under review, not so much to control the work of the agencies 
(Dehousse, 2008, pp. 790ss)1, but to effectively organize the relations between these 
and the other subjects of the Union executive, it seems necessary to identify a model 
that takes into account the plurality of agents and, in particular, the presence of a 
                                                             
1A multi-principals model has been proposed for the purpose of improving the accountability of the 
Union agencies, with which the model proposed here is not intended to contrast, being specifically 
aimed not at the control of the agencies. , but to the management of decision-making processes relating 
to the implementation of Union law. 
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super agent, the EC, to which the Treaties recognize-in particular following the 
reform signed in Lisbon-a pre-eminent role in the implementation of Union law. 
Indeed, it seems absolutely necessary to bring order to the dense network of relations 
between the various actors of the Union executive to prevent the functions and the 
related responsibilities of each body hiding behind similar competences attributed to 
others, making the decision-making process less transparent and probably even less 
effective. 
An example in this sense derives from all those procedures that see EC simply 
confirm-because in most cases the EC does not add anything of its-the decisions 
taken by the agencies through formally non-binding acts, which however can be 
modified by the EC only in exceptional circumstances. In these cases, in fact, there 
is an overlap of functions between agencies and EC, which makes the decision-
making process opaque and, with particular regard to the issuing of delegated acts, 
dilutes that virtuous circuit between legislator and executive that was created for the 
protection of the democratic principle. 
It seems that the issue has also been raised in the inter-institutional debate on the 
future of decentralized agencies; in the preparatory works, in fact, we read that “it 
seems to be the benefit of an overall clarification and, if necessary, the harmonization 
of its various powers towards both agencies and the other actors concerned, while 
preserving agencies' autonomy. The Commission should be clearly accountable for 
activities over which it has authority, but can not be accountable for work over which 
its influence is heavily diluted” (Rittberg, Wonka, 2013). Unfortunately, however, 
the joint declaration was not expressed on this point. 
Moreover, it can not be overlooked that even greater problems seem to emerge from 
those situations in which this overlapping of functions occurs with agencies formed 
by independent national authorities, whose autonomy from the respective national 
governments is perhaps the expression of precise European obligations. In these 
cases, the possibility of activating-in addition to an overlapping of functions-a 
democratic short circuit between the national and the EU levels seems extremely 
relevant and deserves to be underestimated. The national authorities that form these 
agencies, in fact, are protected at national level by specific regulations that establish 
their independence, sometimes even of european origin; at the same time, they 
aggregate at a supranational level to compete together in defining the policies of the 
Union, enjoying a degree of autonomy that is nevertheless significant and, above all, 
of certainly incisive powers. Since these authorities are already independent at 
national level and, at the European Union level, there is already an actor called to 
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pursue the general interests independently of the Member States (this is, of course, 
the EC), it would seem appropriate, pending clear changes to the institutional status 
quo, identify penetrating forms of control of their work, not to damage the 
prerogatives of the latter. Otherwise, the risk is that many different centers of power 
are formed that are competent on individual sectors, to the detriment of the 
possibility of democratically controlling the work of the same: The popular 
sovereignty, in fact, needs to express a fullness and centrality of powers. 
Paradoxically, the indecisions about the future of the agencies and of the EC itself 
seem to have created a system that weakens the EC but also prevents agencies from 
developing fully. Pending a review of the Treaties, a multi-agent model that takes 
into account the fact that the EC is one of the principals of the agencies, contributing 
to the creation, but above all still results the first agent of Member States, Council 
and Parliament, could harmonize the relationships between this and the agencies and, 
above all, would help to outline a more efficient decision-making process. 
Although, as outlined above, the Treaties are quite clear in identifying relevant 
prerogatives for the EC, national administrations and, in part, for the Council, this 
does not imply that this multi-agent model should always lead to the centralization 
of skills under the EC, to the detriment of the agencies. As argued above, in fact, 
even the latter can be attributed greater powers, avoiding duplication of functions 
with the EC, through the definition of precise limits to their work. Among these, for 
example, para-jurisdictional mechanisms could also appear as a hierarchical 
administrative appeal to the EC itself: This mode of quasi-jurisdictional protection, 
oddly present only for a few and incisive agencies, could instead allow the EC to 
express itself on the merits of choices, at this point, left entirely to the agencies, 
whenever they were to be judged detrimental to the interests of a party. Such a system 
would open to sector operators the possibility of highlighting the most questionable 
discretionary choices made by the agencies, helping the EC to exercise its political 
role, and highlight the overarching position of the EC while increasing the operating 
margins of the agencies. 
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14. Concluding Remarks 
In conclusion, we can not fail to notice how, in perspective, an incisive and consistent 
reform of the governance of the Union, with a clear identification of a strong political 
center, would mitigate the need for a multi-agent model, clearly linked to the current 
situation of the executive Union. However, recent trends seem to show that the 
fragmentation of the Union executive and its anti-hegemonic structure will still be a 
characteristic feature of the process of European integration for a long time. At this 
juncture, a clear delimitation of the competences and responsibilities of each person 
is fundamental in order not to complicate the decision-making process. Ultimately, 
although the Lisbon Treaty has widened the margins of development of the bodies 
examined, they will hardly exert, at least up to the next revision of primary law, that 
role of independent market regulators, invoked in recent decades by the doctrine and 
by some political-institutional spheres (Rittberg, Wonka, 2013). The process of 
reforming the governance of the Union is still too immature and, to date, such a 
development would still seem too contrasting with some of the prerogatives 
guaranteed by the EC treaties. 
The current situation, therefore, is characterized by a sensitive fragmentation of the 
Union executive, with frequent overlapping of competences between ECs and 
agencies (Ruffing, 2015, pp. 1110ss), so that it would seem appropriate to abandon 
the ambition to increase the powers and independence of the agencies, focusing 
rather organization of work between the various players of the Union executive. 
Given the centrality of the EC in issuing detailed legislation, confirmed if not 
reinforced by the Lisbon Treaty, a multi-agent model that takes into account that the 
EC is, at the same time, one of the principals of the agencies and, above all, the first 
agent of Council and Parliament (Rittberg, Wonka, 2013), could help to better define 
the functions of the agencies and the EC, to the benefit of transparency and efficiency 
in the decision-making process. 
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